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Sanjay Krishnan, Reading the Global: Troubling Perspectives on Britain's Empire in Asia.
New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 256 pp. ISBN 9780231140706.
Reviewed by Simona Sawhney, University of Minnesota
Literary Reading in the Age of the Global
Michel Foucault's work takes shape in resistance to the enduring power of what he calls "total
history." In the Introduction to The Archaeology of Knowledge (originally published as L'
Archéologie du Savoir in 1969), Foucault describes "total history" thus: "The project of a total
history is one that seeks to reconstitute the overall form of a civilization, the principle—material
or spiritual—of a society, the significance common to all the phenomena of a period, the law that
accounts for their cohesion . . . " [1] Such a project, he claims, depends on a few fundamental
hypotheses: that it is possible to find relations of causality or expressivity among all the events in
a defined spatio-temporal locus; that history becomes manifest as a succession of internally
cohesive stages; and that all the structures—economic, social, political—of a given period are
subject to "the same form of historicity" (10). Central to Foucault's concern, here and elsewhere,
is the unquestioned shape and trajectory of time in total history; a trajectory that, according to
him, seems most deeply implicated in the history of thought: "It is as if it was particularly
difficult, in the history in which men retrace their own ideas and their own knowledge, to
formulate a general theory of discontinuity [. . . . .] As if we were afraid to conceive of the Other
in the time of our own thought" (12).
What does this mean? Let us start by stating the obvious. If Foucault specifically draws our
attention to an other in the time of our thought, this would not be a cultural or political other, but
a temporal other. It would perhaps be another time, a time that may not move synchronically and
progressively, or perhaps even an other of "time," an other that already lives in the time of our
own thought but whose mark or trace we attempt to repress. Freud, in trying to conceive of the
"Other in the time of our own thought" gave this other the name of the unconscious or the id, at
one instance writing "There is nothing in the id that corresponds to the idea of time; there is no
recognition of the passage of time, and—a thing that is most remarkable and awaits
consideration in philosophical thought—no alteration in its mental processes is produced by the
passage of time." [2] When Freud and later Foucault draw attention to the other of/in time, they
are, as we know, interested in calling into question the sovereignty of consciousness, and of the
subject who is the privileged proprietor of this consciousness. Thus, in challenging (Hegelian)
total history Foucault states unambiguously, "Continuous history is the indispensable correlative
of the founding function of the subject . . . . Making historical analysis the discourse of the
continuous and making human consciousness the original subject of all historical development
and all action are the two sides of the same system of thought" (12). Foucault thus suggests that
the "discourse of the continuous" arises to prop up, as it were, this subject, for whom time must
gather all events and phenomena in a homogeneous stream in order to allow it to appropriate the
world as object, or, we might say, as picture.
This becomes very clear elsewhere, when Foucault discusses the emergence of a "will to know"
that distributes the complementary dyad of object and subject: "To go back a little further: at the
turn of the sixteenth century (and particularly in England), there appeared a will to know which,

BRYN MAWR REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE, Volume 9, Number 2 (Fall 2011)

0

1

Bryn Mawr Review of Comparative Literature, Vol. 9, No. 2 [2018], Art. 3

anticipating its actual contents, sketched out schemes of possible, observable, measurable,
classifiable objects; a will to know which imposed on the knowing subject, and in some sense
prior to all experience, a certain position, a certain gaze and a certain function." [3] Foucault's
assertion here, in particular his emphasis on the assignation of a "certain position" and a "certain
gaze," comes close to some of Heidegger's statements, especially in the essay "The Age of the
World Picture"—the essay that provides the inaugural frame for Sanjay Krishnan's recent book
Reading the Global: Troubling Perspectives on Britain's Empire in Asia. Heidegger, in this
frequently cited essay, tries to approach the essence of modern science as a way to understand
the specificity of the modern age. He argues that the transformation of science into research is a
decisive and fundamentally significant event. This transformation and the concomitant centrality
of research as paradigm and method in modernity signify, first and foremost, a prior
apprehension of the world as representable, as picture: "Knowing, as research, calls whatever is
to account with regard to the way in which and the extent to which it lets itself be put at the
disposal of representation." [4] And a little later, "Hence world picture, when understood
essentially, does not mean a picture of the world, but the world conceived and grasped as a
picture. What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in
being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth" (129-130). In other
words, the very being of the world becomes, at a certain historical point, a function of its
representability.
Precisely this question of representation and of the gaze that brings the world—as world—into
view is central to Krishnan's investigation. This is how the book begins: "In this book I study 'the
global' as an instituted perspective, not as an empirical process. The term 'global' describes a way
of bringing into view the world as a single, unified entity, articulated in space and developing
over (common) time" (1). The "global" thus shares a partial affinity with Foucault's "total
history"; hence we may read Krishnan as implying that the phenomenon called globalization, so
often studied in terms of empirical events, flows and movements, should instead be grasped as
intrinsically related to a theoretical stance, taking into account the early sense of theory as
viewing or contemplation. Krishnan's project, like Foucault's, is to question the "naturalization of
this frame": "My argument challenges the ways in which the 'global' has been uncritically
assimilated, in the humanities and social sciences, to a transparent comprehension of the world"
(1). But unlike Foucault, who sought to contest total history by presenting a new method and
style—indeed, an entire set of new questions and objectives—Krishnan proposes something
more modest, something that cannot take the form of a total rejection of "total" history. [5] The
global, he argues, cannot be simply rejected or overcome. But it can be interrupted. The
heterogeneity that the global as perspective necessarily and often forcefully suppresses can be
highlighted and, to use a central term in Krishnan's argument, activated. It is in this context that
the significance of "reading" in the book's title "Reading the Global" emerges. Most simply put,
to read the global is to remain attentive to how the global constitutes and presents itself as the
global; reading "attends to the matter of representation" (5). Following a strong poststructuralist
model, "reading" signals in Krishnan's book a way of critically annotating the movements by
which text is assembled, and hence resisting the attraction of "language-as-communication." It
involves deliberately moving away from the position to which the reader is ushered by the
loudest or most seductive voice in the text; it involves renouncing the most comfortable chair,
the one clearly labeled "You, Reader," and instead walking around, trying to hear while squatting
in a musty corner or crouching behind a curtained recess. Reading is a critical practice, and
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Krishnan's contention is that it can "make the global respond to perspectives that are suppressed
or invalidated by its overt claims but activated through its manner of representation" (14).
In the four chapters of the book, Krishnan proceeds to demonstrate this contention with
admirable care, creativity, and skill. His geographical focus is on the Malay Archipelago, which
appeared on the map of the global as a commercial zone linking India and China. Because of its
geopolitical significance for the British Empire, and because it has been home to several
intermingling communities over the centuries (thus challenging implicitly the founding premises
of "nationalism" or nation-hood), it provides, Krishnan claims, a particularly strong example of
both the discursive power of the global, and the various manners in which it may be contested.
The book's first chapter, a brilliant reading of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations (1776),
directly confronts Smith's attempt to imagine an ethical and natural empire. In arguing against
the rapacious effects of mercantile capitalism, Smith calls for a more responsible capitalism that
would align itself with natural and subsistence economies.
What interests Krishnan is precisely the text's reliance on the figure of subsistence. By drawing
attention to the figure, rather than the concept, of subsistence, Krishnan wants us to notice all the
rhetorical charge—the moral and political energy—accumulated by this term in this particular
text. Thus, although Smith's narrative ostensibly turns to "subsistence" only to make a case for
the moral right of free trade (free trade as an extension of subsistence economies), Krishnan
demonstrates that once the figure is put into play it inadvertently begins to inflect the argument,
generating "unexpected and wayward" effects. It implicitly calls the reader's attention to those
"formidably diverse economies in which the disembedded or self-regulating market is not in
place" (43). Krishnan's aim is to reveal, here and elsewhere, how a text's strategies of persuasion
may also turn against it, in the ears of a capable reader. In Smith's work, free trade must, in
effect, justify itself in terms of a moral code that both precedes and, more significantly,
challenges free trade's own implicit conceptions of economy, work, exchange, and, indeed, life.
This internal unease in the narrative in fact brings into view the very economies that free trade
wishes to surpass and erase. The following chapters all follow a similarly structured argument: in
each case, Krishnan focuses on a figure that the text marginalizes or suppresses in order to probe
how the very act of subordination invests with a certain energy that which is inimical to the
global perspective. What makes Krishnan's approach distinct from any number of literary studies
that read a text "against the grain" or seek to recuperate the perspectives of marginalized or even
absent characters is his focus on conceptual (rather than strictly human) figures. This is what
gives the argument unusual density and weight. Chapter Two thus examines the tension between
the trajectories and implications of opium as commodity and as narcotic in De Quincey's
Confessions of an English Opium-Eater (1821); Chapter Three on Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir's
attempt in Hikayat Abdullah (1849) to replicate the global perspective in a pedagogic mode and
those textual elements which interrupt or question this perspective; and Chapter Four on the
figure of the animal in Conrad's Lord Jim and its potential sabotage of the novel's ethico-imperial
perspective.
As I read the book, it seems to draw upon three related but distinct intellectual arguments: a postMarxist critique of historicism; an insistence on the materiality and non-transparence of language
(most often associated with structuralism and its heirs); and a postcolonial critique of European
colonial capitalism and the epistemological categories it nourished. The last of these three
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invigorates the other two with new political vitality, so that the stakes of the critique of
historicism, for instance, become more sharply evident. As Krishnan notes in his introduction,
"The global therefore is not just a peculiar mode of thematization: it is aligned to a conception of
historical development unique to European colonial capitalism" (16). It is not simply
imperialism, but specifically capitalist imperialism, according to Krishnan, that is most invested
in the global, read now as the normalization and the complex propagation of the dominant
perspective. Krishnan's project is thus in many ways related to Dipesh Chakrabarty's in
Provincializing Europe—in terms of its critique of historicism as well as its attempt to think
Marx and Heidegger together from a postcolonial position. Indeed, Krishnan's concerns and
moves often seem so close to Chakrabarty's that one wishes he had engaged in a more overt and
detailed manner with Chakrabarty's argument. Krishnan refers to Provincializing Europe only
once in his entire book—in the very last endnote, where he registers a significant distinction
between his and Chakrabarty's reading of a much-cited passage from Nehru's Discovery of India.
But the larger implications of this distinction are not spelt out in a comprehensive manner, and
certain similarities still appear striking. Though a thorough comparison is not warranted here, let
me briefly give an example that points toward a recurring confluence. In discussing the
alternative perspectives that speak through Hikayat Abdullah, Krishnan writes that "Abdullah's
father's protest need not be read condescendingly—as an older way of life that must be
overcome—and is instead activated in an interruptive and supplementary relation to the
dominant colonial order" (121). Is not the relationship posited here between the father's protest
and the dominant order structurally akin to the relationship Chakrabarty describes between what
he calls History 1 and History 2? [6]
Referring to Marx's writings on history, and primarily Theories of Surplus Value, Chakrabarty
proposes that this work identifies two different kinds of history. History 1 would be the past
"posited by capital itself as its precondition" (63)—a narrative of the past that presumes a
teleology leading to the capitalist mode of production. However, antecedant to capital are also
other relationships and elements that do not contribute to this narrative and cannot be claimed as
part of capital's own biography, so to speak. Leaving aside for the moment the intriguing
examples of History 2 discussed by Marx, let me focus on Chakrabarty's rhetoric (the "matter of
representation") as he describes the function and role of History 2: "History 2s are thus not pasts
separate from capital; they inhere in capital and yet interrupt and punctuate the run of capital's
own logic" (64); "History 2 is better thought of as a category charged with the function of
constantly interrupting the totalizing thrusts of History 1" (66). To quickly summarize my claim:
"reading," in Krishnan's argument, is surely close to "History 2" in Chakrabarty's. Yet they are
not identical.
If we juxtapose the two texts, we could imagine at least part of Krishnan's possible response to
Chakrabarty. Let us recall Chakrabarty's own description of his quest: "I ask for a history that
deliberately makes visible, within the very structure of its narrative forms, its own repressive
strategies and practices . . ." (45). If I read Krishnan's argument correctly, his response, in a
nutshell, would be the following: all texts necessarily expose their repressive strategies, albeit in
ambiguous or ambivalent ways, and the task of reading is precisely to attend to such moments of
exposure. Thus, we could say that whereas History 2 refers to what we may call subaltern
histories, "reading" refers, not to a substantive series, but rather to a practice. Yet, as Krishnan
describes it, it remains a practice predicated on the recognition of the claims of the subaltern.
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Krishnan's emphasis on reading, rich and productive as it is, then raises for me two related
questions. Let me attempt to articulate them here as coherently as I can. First, Krishnan's analysis
of the global seems to oscillate between two somewhat different formulations: the global at times
seems to be a specific ideology, the ideology of colonial capitalism that equips capitalism with
moral, ethical, political, and aesthetic qualities. As Krishnan notes, "The emergence of a global
perspective coincides with a new kind of territorial and commercial empire in Asia and a new
ideology of imperial governance based at once on greater formal state control and free trade"
(18); correlatively, at several moments, it seems clear that the interruption of the global is
synonymous with the interruption of a "normative Eurocentric framework" (121). But at other
times, the global is simply the dominant narrative perspective in a text, as for instance Marlow's
in Lord Jim. Krishnan's attempt in the chapter on Lord Jim is thus to bring to focus the means by
which "Marlow's voice is interrupted and pluralized, for although he is the one who speaks, we
are not always obliged to see through his eyes" (149). This double or twin assignation of the
global need not be read as a contradiction or even a problem. Indeed, we could quite easily
conclude that Krishnan is interested precisely in demonstrating that the ideology of colonial
capitalism, as the dominant ideology of modernity, appears in several powerful works—whether
European or non-European—as the dominant narrative voice; that this narrative voice becomes,
so to speak, the representative, or at the very least, the ally, of the dominant ideology. But this is
not quite what Krishnan says, for such a deterministic proposition would imply a stronger
base/superstructure division than would be compatible with his larger frame and conceptual
method. It seems to me, therefore, that the relation between these two senses of global—as
ideology and narrative investment—deserved more rigorous theoretical attention. The closest
Krishnan comes to articulating this relation is when he writes, toward the end of the book, "In
this book I have argued that the matter of representation serves as an allegory of a historicity that
situates or encompasses the mode of perspectivizing in which global histories are produced, and
that it is precisely by means of representation's interruptive potential that it begins to
acknowledge the complexity of the world in which we live" (166; emphasis mine). At the very
least, it would have been helpful to spell out more distinctly what the word "allegory" means
here. To clarify: my central question here concerns the methodological frame of Krishnan's
argument, which seems to be more "Marxist" than is acknowledged. So I would have liked to see
either a more clear theoretical exposition of why Krishnan's analysis cannot be assimilated to a
Marxist frame, or a more overt commitment to, and exploration of, precisely that frame.
The second question is related. Krishnan invites us to think of the global as a text—and by
implication, to think of ideology itself as a text. This is evident, not only in the significance
accorded to "reading," but also in some salient descriptive statements: ". . . the global denotes
both the frame that makes such heterogeneity visible and the heterogeneity by which that frame
is exceeded or displaced" (49). This is also what allows him to make a case for the significance
of textual analysis and literary study—that is indeed a strong theme running through the book. In
thinking about the task for literary study in the "age of globalization," Krishnan proposes that
attentiveness to rhetorical movement exhibits how perspectives and values are naturalized; what
literature can teach best, Krishnan reminds us, is "loosening the ways in which . . . a perspective
is dissimulated as sight" (167). Implicit in such moves is a questioning of social scientific
approaches to the question and theme of the "global." All this I find persuasive and timely. I
continue, however, to be troubled by a question that precedes my reading of this book, but to
which the book once again turns my attention. As a teacher of literature, it is a question that has
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often occupied me, especially in a world where, as Krishnan's book demonstrates so skillfully,
the "dominant" perspective (of colonial capitalism and Eurocentric knowledge production) has
been rendered so thoroughly habitual and "natural." My question is the following: though
students of literature can perhaps be trained to approach texts by way of a "defamiliarizing
engagement" (22), what sort of education could teach them to want to "activate" the perspectives,
signals, and figures that have been suppressed or rendered subordinate? To put it most bluntly,
wouldn't one first need to be convinced of the necessity of a resistant political stance in order to
read "against the grain"? Is it the task of literary study to inculcate such politics, and can it ever
be equipped to do so? I find intriguing here Krishnan's recourse to the figure of "cultivation" in
his own descriptions of the task of literary study: "A modest task that literary or cultural study in
the era of globalization can set itself is to cultivate critical reflexes that actively interrupt the
global perspective" (14; emphasis mine). How may we articulate the theoretical or conceptual
relation between a critical practice of close reading on the one hand and such cultivation on the
other? These seem to me to be complex but crucial questions that any defense of literary study—
or indeed, any attempt to rethink the discipline anew—must address. After all, the aim of much
"progressive" literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was precisely to open paths by
which privileged readers could "identify" with the perspectives, lives, and troubles of those who
experienced the world as a place of sharper scarcity and deprivation. The inculcation of
sympathy and the affective teaching of outrage were thus political "justifications" for reading
literature. Now that "literature" as a category itself seems a relic, and identification appears as the
ruse of an exploitative ideology, we perhaps still await a theoretically and politically persuasive
defense of literary study. My sense is that such a defense may proceed more productively if it
conceives of literary study as being, from the outset, in a creative and new alliance with the
social sciences—even an antagonistic alliance, if such a thing were possible—rather than in a
relation of mutual distrust.
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